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YOUR SPYING SMARTPHONE: INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IS
NARROWLY STRENGTHENED IN CARPENTER V UNITED
STATES, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S MOST RECENT FOURTH
AMENDMENT RULING
Vania Mia Chaker, Esq.
Abstract
Recently, the United States Supreme Court wrestled with the
profoundly complex and bedeviling issue of individual privacy in the
landmark case of Carpenter v. United States. It is the most recent in a
long line of Fourth Amendment cases that examine an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court
revisited and expanded upon this query from Riley v. California2 and
United States v. JoneS 3-both progeny of Katz v. United States,4 the
leading case in this area.
The Carpenter Court ruled the government required a warrant before
it could use private information arising from defendant Timothy
Carpenter's cellular phone -specifically,
his cell site location
information (CSLI). In the 5-4 decision, the Court ruled "narrowly" in
favor of privacy, finding the government had constitutionally violated Mr.
Carpenter's reasonable expectation of privacy by acquiring this private
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Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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information without a warrant. It ruled that, as a cell phone customer, Mr.
Carpenter could reasonably expect that his CSLI would be treated as
private, even though it was in the possession of a third party. In so ruling,
the Court declined to apply the long-standino third-party doctrine of
UnitedStates v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland. These cases, which stand
for the proposition that there is a reduced expectation of privacy in
information an individual knowingly shares with another, have thus been
narrowed. 10
Against a backdrop of stunningly advanced surveillance technology
and the strictures of the United States Constitution, the question of how
individual privacy comports with the need for police investigation is a
complex and impressively difficult one. In the current political landscape,
judicial vigilance becomes increasingly important in protecting the
appropriate dimensions of individual privacy. The grave risks of
governmental abuse may militate in favor of strengthened judicial
oversight in determining the parameters of the state's broad investigative
powers. Strong privacy protections may indeed serve to function as a
safeguard against the risks of governmental overreach, police
misconduct, and improper warrantless surveillance.
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I give

the fight up; let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me,
I want to be forgotten even by God.
Robert Browning, Paracelsus (1835)
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court again wrestled with the profoundly
complex and bedeviling issue of individual privacy in the landmark case
of Carpenter v. United States." It is the most recent in a long line of
Fourth Amendment cases that examine an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court revisited and
expanded upon this query from Riley v. California1 2 and UnitedStates v.
Jones 1 3-both progeny of Katz v. United States, 14 the leading case in this
area. In the 5-4 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion
of the CarpenterCourt in favor of individual freedom, in which Associate
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan joined.
The CarpenterCourt ruled the government required a warrant before
it could use private information acquired from defendant Timothy
Carpenter's cellular phone -specifically, his cell site location
information (CSLI). The Court ruled "narrowly" in favor of privacy,
finding the government had constitutionally violated Mr. Carpenter's
reasonable expectation of privacy by acquiring this private information
without a warrant.16 It ruled that, as a cell phone customer, Mr. Carpenter
could reasonably expect that his CSLI would be treated as private, even
though it was in the possession of a third party.17 In so ruling, the Court
declined to apply the long-standing third-party doctrine of United States
v. Miller" and Smith v. Maryland. 9 The holdings in these cases, which
stand for the proposition that there is a reduced expectation of privacy in
information an individual knowingly shares with another, have thus been

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2220.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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narrowed. 2 0 Because of this striking departure from prior precedent,
21
Carpenter is considered a landmark decision.
Justices Anthony Kennedy, Neil Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, and
Samuel Alito, however, roundly criticized the opinion. Justice Thomas
filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch also filed a dissenting
opinion. The dissenting Justices seemed most concerned with what they
considered the majority's lack of clear guidance and specificity as to what
would constitute constitutional conduct during a police investigation. 22
Some Justices also expressed concern that law enforcement's legitimate
need to investigate its cases could be compromised. Justice Alito, for
example, stated that he believed the decision may imperil many valuable
and entrenched investigative practices upon which law enforcement has
historically relied 23-a worry echoed by other dissenting Justices. As
Justice Kennedy quoted from Riley to explain 24 : "In short, the Court's
new and uncharted course will inhibit law enforcement and 'keep
defendants and judges guessing for years to come."' He deemed this to
be a grave consequence for the "proper administration of justice. ,,25 A
common, overshadowing thread in the dissenting opinions seemed to
center around the extent to which the scope of the third-party doctrine
20. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
21. See, e.g., id.; Whether the Fourth Amendment Permits the Government to Obtain Six
Months
of
Cell
Phone
Location
Records
Without
a
Warrant,
EPIC,

https://epic.org/amicus/location/carpenter/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2018); see also Allen O'Rourke,
SCOTUS Issues Landmark Decision on Cell Phone Location Information with Major
Implications for Fourth Amendment Privacy, A.B.A. Bus. L. TODAY (July 17, 2018),

https://businesslawtoday.org/2018/07/scotus-issues-landmark-decision-cell-phone-locationinformation-major-implications-fourth-amendment-privacy/.
22. Justice Kennedy, for example, wrote, "the majority opinion gives courts and law
enforcement officers no indication how to determine whether any particular category of
information falls on the financial-records side or the cell-site-records side of its newly conceived
constitutional line." Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy went

on to note: "The Court's multifactor analysis-considering intimacy, comprehensiveness,
expense, retrospectivity, and voluntariness-puts the law on a new and unstable foundation. Id.
Justice Thomas stated: "Suffice it to say, the Founders would be confused by this Court's
transformation of their common-law protection of property into a 'warrant requirement' and a
vague inquiry into 'reasonable expectations of privacy."' Id. at 2244 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23. Justice Alito warned: "I share the Court's concern about the effect of new technology
on personal privacy, but I fear that today's decision will do far more harm than good. The Court's
reasoning fractures two fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law, and in doing so, it
guarantees a blizzard of litigation while threatening many legitimate and valuable investigative
practices upon which law enforcement has rightfully come to rely." Id. at 2246-47 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
24. Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Riley
v. Cahfornia, 573 U.S. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014)).

25. Justice Kennedy noted: "[T]he Court fails even to mention the serious consequences
this will have for the proper administration of justice." Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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would be narrowed as well as how and where to draw these new
constitutional boundaries. It is not entirely clear in what way the
government's reliance on the third-party doctrine will be affected in
future cases.
Perhaps in an attempt to assuage the dissenting Justices' concerns,
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the ruling should only be considered a
"narrow"26or limited-win for individual privacy. The question of
exactly where to judicially delineate the parameters of privacy is one that
is far from over, however, particularly given the significant fissure in the
Court regarding such issues. This query may become more complicated
by the change in the composition of the Bench in the wake of Justice
Kennedy's retirement and the confirmation of the most recently
appointed Justice to the Supreme Court. President Trump is likely to
nominate a judge that is significantly more politically conservative than
27
Justice Kennedy, who was often a swing vote in close decisions.
Justices' views on privacy are notoriously idiosyncratic, however.
Kennedy, a "moderate," was anti-privacy in the Carpenter case while
Roberts, a "conservative," was pro-privacy.
Moreover, given the tenuous 5-4 majority, it is not a foregone
conclusion that the same line of reasoning-or even a similar ruling in
favor of privacy-will prevail during the next Fourth Amendment
challenge. In already murky and uncertain waters, the change in the
composition of the Bench further underscores the fragile nature of the
alliance that formed in Carpenter, which only narrowly tempered the
government's warrantless investigative reach.
I. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT NATURE
OF PRESENT-DAY CELLULAR DEVICES

Some facts may help contextualize this important ruling. In 2013,
Timothy Carpenter was convicted of robbing Radio Shack and T-Mobile
stores where-ironically-he stole new smart phones. 28 Because a
firearm was involved in the commission of the crimes, the district court
29
sentenced him to 1,395 months, or 116.25 years, in federal prison.
During its investigation, the government had obtained extensive location
information from Mr. Carpenter's cellular phone, evidence which the
26. Id. at 2220 ("Our decision today is a narrow one.").
27. As of the writing of this Article, Judge Brett Kavanagh, a judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, has been nominated by President Trump to fill the vacancy left by
Justice Kennedy. Judge Kavanaugh is considered by most to be a politically conservative judge.
See, e.g., The Path Ahead for Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/politics/supreme-court-justice-nominations/?
noredirect=on&utmterm=.2a4f5al6eee7 (last updated July 9, 2018).
28. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
29. Id. at 2213.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

6

[Vol. 23

government then used to convict him.30 Specifically, the government
obtained 12,898 location points tracking Mr. Carpenter for over 127
days.3 1 Interestingly, only four of those location points placed Mr.
Carpenter near cell sites where the robberies had occurred.32
Technology is certainly our friend, but it is also capable of alarming
intrusions and insidious insinuations into our personal lives. The very
same technology that has become deeply entrenched into the fabric of
daily life can be used to surreptitiously surveil and monitor those who
rely on it in ways few could ever have imagined. In its opinion, the Court
discussed the constitutionality of the government's warrantless use of the
personal information that could be gleaned from "spying smart phones,"
including the CSLI at issue.3 3
The Carpenter Court found the ease with which the government can
use smart phones to monitor people's whereabouts throughout the
entirety of each day, and then store that information for lengthy periods
of time, to be profoundly troubling.3 4 The Court ruled the use of such
"deeply revealing" 35 information-that had been obtained without a
warrant-to be unconstitutional under two lines of legal doctrine. 36 First,
the government's use of the CSLI data violated a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy under a Katz analysis.3 7 Second, it fell awry of the
third-party doctrine under the Miller and Smith line of cases.3 8
In rendering its decision, the Court focused greatly on the public's
ubiquitous reliance on cellular phones 3 9 and the great breadth of
information that can be obtained from them. 40 The Court observed that
personal devices are in widespread use with the vast majority of people
relying on them on a daily, if not continual, basis.4 1 It also looked to the
fact that cellular phones are qualitatively far different today from analog
phones-or even cellular phones of a prior generation.4 2 These spying
smart phones enable the government to obtain a tremendous amount of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 2212-13.
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2213.
Id. at 2217-19.
See id.
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2214-15.
Id. at 2217-19.
Id. at 2219-220.

39. Id. at 2211 ("There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United Statesfor a Nation of 326 million people.").
40. Id. at 2217-18.
41. Id. at 2218.
42. Id. at 2217.
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information about their users, which includes location data as well as a
plethora of other personal information.4 3
Smart phones also often allow access to computer files and other
personal information that is virtually stored in "the cloud." 44 Cellular
phones have become mini-computers, cameras, stereo systems,
telephones, alarm clocks, fitness trackers, and countless other consumer
devices-all rolled into one pocket-sized, but very powerful and
seemingly omniscient, device. A smart phone's functionality, however,
necessarily relies upon the owner's private and often highly sensitive
personal information. Bank account balances, credit card account
numbers, the names and numbers of loved ones, personal photographs,
text messages, health and medical history, fitness tracking, location
information, access to digital personal and work files, and all sorts of
other personal data are all easily accessible from the cellular phones of
most individuals.
II. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE UNDER
KATZ AND THE RECENTLY EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT LANDSCAPE

The Court ultimately ruled that the government's warrantless access
to an individual's CSLI was unconstitutional.4 5 So let us turn to the first
facet of the judicial opinion which focused on a Katz analysis. In
Carpenter, as in Riley and Jones, the Court retreated a bit from the
Supreme Court precedent that seemed to allow law enforcement
somewhat greater latitude in the post-9/11 era. 46 Instead, it harked back
to one of the Fourth Amendment's most famous legal doctrines that has
often historically served to narrow law enforcement's investigative reach.
Evoking Katz, the Court reaffirmed that citizens have a reasonable
expectation of privacy over highly personal information such as the CSLI
.47
at issue in this case.
Some of the same privacy concerns the Court voiced in Jones and
Riley resonated in Carpenter.4 8 All three cases seem to center on the
government's intrusive access to private information made possible by
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 393-97

(2010).
45. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
46. Id. at 2218-19; See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
47. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
48. Although the Court's decision in Jones ultimately turned on a property rights analysis
as discussed in the Knotts and Karo line of cases, similar threads of concerns regarding an
individual's expectation of privacy arose in Jones,Riley, and Carpenter.See id. at 2217-19; Riley
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-52, 95557, 963-64 (2012).

8

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 23

technological advances.4 9 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized in
Carpenter, as he did in Riley, that the public's ever-greater reliance on
digital technology is a reality of modem life. Moreover, the widespread
use of cell phones, which contain the "privacies of life,"5 0 makes
individuals' sensitive information particularly susceptible to intrusion.
Not only do cell phones allow access to a great amount of personal
information and sensitive data, but cellular phones are often
figuratively-if not literally-joined at the hip of their owners. This
affords the government a wealth of additional information that derives
specifically from the location data. Given that most people carry their
phones with them virtually everywhere, Justice Roberts observed that
cell-site location records essentially provide the government with "near
perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone's
user." 52 This data enables the government to learn precisely where the
phone-and thus the person-has been and at what time-as well as what
other cellular phones were in the same area at that same time.5 3 The
Carpenter Court made specific reference to the highly intrusive nature of
such information, which it characterized as the "detailed, encyclopedic
and effortless" tracking of a person using CSLI data.54
The Court's observation that people would not expect police to track
their every movement over long periods of time, which was exactly what
cell site location records did, was pivotal. The Court noted that, as a
result of the CSLI, the government was also privy to possibly more
sensitive collateral information.56 This includes every location a person
has traveled and nearly everyone she has met.57 Moreover, the Court
noted this information was available to law enforcement not only on a
going-forward basis but also historically going back five years-all
58
without a warrant.

In Jones, the Court expressed similar concern over the government's
ability to warrantlessly track, routinely surveil, and record an individual's
49. See Jones at 132 S. Ct. at 953-54, 963-64; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19; Riley, 134
S. Ct. at 2493.
50. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (2014) (citations omitted) ("Modem cell phones are not

just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold
for many Americans 'the privacies of life.').
51. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2216.
55. Id. at 2217.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2218; Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter, the Supreme Court Rules, Narrowly,
for Privacy, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-

comment/in-carpenter-the-supreme-court-rule s-narrowly-for-privacy
("Generally,
phone carriers keep such data for five years, but there is no technological limit.").

cell-
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every movement 59 that would not have otherwise been subject to public
view. 6 0 Justice Sotomayor worried that warrantless monitoring-such as
with a GPS device or a smartphone-could serve to reveal the deeply
personal information that derives from location data, such as "trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment
center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar
and on and on." 6 1 This speaks directly to the "privacies of life" 62 and the
very core of our being. The same alarm raised in Jones and Riley
reemerged in Carpenter.3 The Court therefore ruled a warrant would first
be required for law enforcement to obtain location data from cellular
phone carriers since Mr. Carpenter had a legitimate expectation of
*
64
privacy in such information.
III. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The second dimension of the legal analysis centered around the thirdparty doctrine, the tenet that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily turned over to a third party.6 5 The
Carpenter Court narrowed its prior holdings in United States v. Miller,
which established the third-party doctrine, and in Smith v. Maryland,
which extended the third-party doctrine to information related to
telephone records.6 6
Justice Lewis Powell's words in Miller help explain the rationale
underlying the third-party doctrine67
The depositor [i.e. an ordinary citizen] takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by thatperson to the Government. This Court has
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.

59. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012).
60. Id. at 955-56; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
61. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009)).
62. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
63. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19.
64. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
65. Id. at 2219-220.
66. Id. at 2220; Smithy. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976).
67. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In other words, the Miller Court ruled the Fourth Amendment does
not preclude the government from obtaining information without a
warrant that a person voluntarily provides to a third party. 68 This
reasoning rests on the premise that a person loses his "legitimate
expectation of privacy" in information he himself reveals to third
parties.69 As such, the Miller Court deemed it constitutional that such
information be freely passed on to the government.7 0
The Jones Court declined to overrule the third-party doctrine;
however, it voiced stirrings of concern regardin this legal construct that
later reemerged more forcefully in Carpenter. Justice Sotomayor, for
example expressed her unease in her concurring opinion in Jones as
follows71 :

[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
The Court questioned whether individuals would knowingly intend to
waive their privacy rights if they allowed third party access to their
personal information as they do on a prosaic, everyday basis-often by
.73

necessity :

People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text
to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the
e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet
service providers; and the books, groceries and medications
they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that

all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
She concluded in Jones, for example, that "[o]wners of GPS-equipped
cars and smartphones do not contemplate that these devices will be used
to enable covert surveillance of their movements."74

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 444-46.
See id. at 443.
Id. at 443-45.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
Id. at 956-57.
Id. at 957.

74. Id. at 956 (referring to the asterisked discussion of United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
707 (1984)).
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Justice Sotoma or's admonition in Jones seems to have presaged the
Carpenter ruling. The Carpenter Court voiced skepticism over the
76
third-party doctrine as it did in Jones. Given the extensive amount of
deeply personal information people typically share with third parties on
an everyday basis, the CarpenterCourt concluded that ordinary citizens
would likely not expect such information to be freely available to the
government without a warrant.
The Court noted how certain third
parties maintain encyclopedic knowledge on individuals in a manner that
was not possible during the time Miller and Smith were decided7 8 :
Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical
witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on
comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is
nearly infallible. There is a world of difference between the
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and
Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today.
A great degree of the intrusiveness characterizing the government's
investigative practices stems from the highly advanced nature of current
technology.7 9 Within the context of today's digital age, advanced
technology has allowed the sort of intrusion that had not been previously
possible. But this is the reality of our new digital world.8 0 The Court
remarked that "seismic shifts in digital technology [have] made possible
the tracking of not only Carpenter's location but also everyone else's, not
for a short period but for years and years." 8 1 This is possible because
"modem cell phones generate increasingly vast amounts of increasingly
precise CSLI." 8 2
The Court concluded that an individual has a legitimate expectation
of privacy over such CSLI that he would not intend to renounce only
because of a cursory decision to use third party services83
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the
fact that the information is held by a third party does not by
itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. Whether the Government employs its own
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 957.
Id. at 955-56; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
Id. at 2219.
See id. at 2218-19.
See id.
Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2217.
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surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the
technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record
of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The
location information obtained from Carpenter's wireless
carriers was the product of a search.
The dangers inherent to such trends and the reality of the greatly
advanced digital world in which we live may have influenced the Court's
decision. Although the CarpenterCourt did not overrule Smith and Miller
in their entirety, it also "decline[d] to extend Smith and Miller to cover
these novel circumstances." 84 Carpenter may foreshadow a further
narrowing of the third-party doctrine; and it will be interesting to see
whether this contraction continues. The Court may well recognize that
the increasing government intrusion possible as a result of
ever-advancing technology, coupled with individuals' unintended
relinquishment of private information to third parties, may run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment.
IV. THE HIGHLY INTRUSIVE NATURE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
MAY POTENTIALLY LEAD TO A FURTHER NARROWING OF THE
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

Notwithstanding the significance of this judicial decision, Chief
Justice Roberts specifically characterized it as having a relatively
"narrow" reach. 5 He noted, for example, that it does not affect other
aspects of the third-party doctrine, such as banking records.8 6 It also does
not prevent warrantless "real time CSLI information or 'tower dumps,,"8 7
access to cellular tower data in emergencies, or retrieval for "national
security reasons." 8 8 Despite this caveat, the Carpenter decision
represents an important, albeit narrow, contraction of well-established
Fourth Amendment precedent. This decision may therefore set the stage
for future legal challenges. 89
Because the Carpenter Court focused its concern on advanced
technologies that allow the government to engage in highly intrusive
investigative practices, areas involving warrantless data retrieval seem
particularly ripe for future Supreme Court review. 90 Such future
challenges could increasingly constrict the scope of the third-party
doctrine and further stem the greater investigative latitude the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 2220.
See id.; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Id.
Id.; see Sorkin, supra note 58.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19; see also, e.g., Soghoian, supra note 44, at 386.
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government has enjoyed in the post-9/11 era. 91 After all, the public seems
to have begun to increasingly tolerate a certain degree of diminution in
civil liberties in exchange for a greater sense of safety in a society rife
with perceived terrorist threats.
The significant issues expressed in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter make
it foreseeable that similar Fourth Amendment challenges are far from
over. 9 2 Cloud computing, for example, seems like another perfect
"domain" for improper law enforcement investigation and surveillance
* *93
that may later result in judicial review :
The shift to cloud computing obviously brings many
benefits to law enforcement:
significantly reduced
manpower requirements, no need to go before a judge or
establish probable cause in order to obtain a warrant, as well
as the complete elimination of physical risk to agents who
might be shot or attacked during a raid.
From the government's point of view, the potential benefits of such
digital investigations are myriad and deliciously tempting. With the
advent of cloud computing, a person's entire digital life can be stored in
cyberspace. Since files are already uploaded and stored on third-party
servers, the government has far easier and likely greater access to an
individual's digital information than it would with a traditional search of
physical items in a home.94 More importantly, the government can also
seek to bypass the warrant requirement and obtain the digital files with a
mere subpoena, arguing that the individual had himself turned over the
91. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27

(2001). These cases represent judicial precedent that arguably afforded the government greater
investigative latitude. See also, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001, Pub. L.

No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (affording the government greater investigative latitude in order to fight
the "War on Terror").
92. See USA PATRIOT ACT; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19; Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57, 963-64 (2012);
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
93. Soghoian, supra note 44, at 387.

94. Here is one explanation of why this is: "So in this digital age, police often do not need
to show probable cause of a crime when they want to find out details about your life that they
used to find in your home. Instead, they can get your private files from corporations that store
your records on their computers. And instead of a search warrant, the police might just need a
subpoena-which is 'trivially easy to issue,' says Bankston of the Center for Democracy and
Technology. Law enforcement doesn't need ajudge's approval to obtain subpoenas-prosecutors
can sign them on their own, as can authorized employees at federal and state agencies. And law
enforcement agents don't need evidence that there's likely a crime. They need only to be able to
show that the records they want are relevant to an investigation." Daniel Zwerdling, All Things
Considered: Your Digital Trail: Does The FourthAmendment Protect Us?, NPR (Oct. 2, 2013,
1:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/ sections/alltechconsidered/2013/10/02/228134269/your-digital-

trail-does-the-fourth-amendment -protect-us.
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information to a third party. 9 5 A government agent would certainly
welcome the ability to virtually access a target's most personal
information in cyberspace, conveniently from the comfort of a well-lit,
air-conditioned office-perhaps while sipping a cup of coffee. 9 6 No more
cramped late-night stake outs or last minute surveillance runs. 9 7
A cloud user-or government interloper-can also effortlessly
manipulate, retrieve, and organize a typically extensive array of digital
files at its leisure. This includes potentially unlimited, "on demand"
access to a complete library of a person's most private informationincluding writings, photographs, and financial data-figuratively and
literally. Depending on the third-party entity holding the sought-after
information, the government could likely access this information with the
mere request of a subpoena-a simple stroke of a pen-without the
safeguard of a warrant. 9 After all, a subpoena requires very little. 99 A
police officer or federal agent need only justify the request according to
his department's own internal policies, which may be faulty or woefully
deficient. 100 There is no judicial oversight of the request, 10 1 and law
enforcement is not immune from mistake, impropriety, or abject
wrongdoing. The implications of the government's far-reaching and
relatively unfettered access to an individual's private information are
grave and should therefore raise concerns for all.
V. IS THE GOVERNMENT'S VAST ARRAY OF AGGRESSIVE-AND HIGHLY
INTRUSIVE-COVERT SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES CONSTITUTIONAL?

The Carpenter Court underscored the concern that investigational
practices currently employed by the government are alarmingly-and
unlawfully-intrusive. 02 Within this context, the Internet of Things
(loT) is another area of technology ripe for governmental abuse. The loT
affords the public a vast array of conveniences while also concomitantly
creating a potential conduit for the government to violate the sanctity of
our homes and insinuate itself into our private lives. 103
"Smart" televisions and other "smart" devices, for example, can
monitor and store sounds and conversations that occur inside of the
homes in which they are located-including bedrooms, living rooms, and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
See id.; Soghoian, supra note 44, at 386.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
Zwerdling, supra note 94.
Id.

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
103. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things andthe FourthAmendment ofEffects,
104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 805 (2016) ("'Smart objects' connected to the 'Internet of Things' present

new possibilities for technological surveillance.").
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nurseries.104 The audio captured could be highly personal, including, for
example, a child's giggle, a baby's gurgle, or a lover's whisper. Samsung
has confirmed that "even if the owner opts out of the voice-recognition
feature . . the set will still capture what is said."10 5 But the intrusion does
not end there: After capturing those sounds, these smart devices can
possibly transmit that audio to third parties.106 Please allow me to
rephrase: Some stranger somewhere might very well have the ability to
spy on you or your family's most private moments as well as gain
information about your children and your family's patterns of life. 10
Depending on future judicial interpretations of Carpenter, the loT
could possibly bestow the government with a virtual superhighway into
the most private areas of our lives. Questions of legality and
constitutionality aside, many of us would consider these sorts of covert
intrusions quite alarming. To most people, the implications of this are
enormous. Many would feel these sorts of intrusions are not just wrong,
but truly violating.
Of course, this is but one example. There are myriad other examples
of covert surveillance which may potentially be available to police
without a warrant. Some retail stores use cameras with facial recognition
and surreptitious biometric iris scanning technology that can be easily
hidden, for example, in mannequins. 108 The government itself utilizes
long-distance iris scanners to surveil public places and amass biometric
information on its citizenry-surreptitiously and without consent.109
License plate scanners of automobiles on the roadway and in parking lots
are in widespread use, monitoring our movements, driving habits, and
travel patterns.110 "Eyes in the Sky" have become increasingly common
as law enforcement has begun to employ warrantless drone surveillance

104. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Be Careful What You Say When Your Smart TVIs On, Samsung
Warns Customers, A.B.A. J. NEWS. WKLY. (Feb. 9, 2015, 10:15 AM) (emphasis added),

http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/be-careful what yousay when-your smart tv is on
samsung warns customers.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id; Zwerdling, supra note 94.
108. See Mark G. Milone, Biometric Surveillance: Searchingfor Identity, 57 Bus. LAW. 497
(2001); FacialRecognition, EFF, https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition (last visited Aug.
31, 2018).
109. See sources cited supra note 108.
110. See Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), EFF, https://www.eff.org/pages/

automated-license-plate-readers-alpr (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) ("Automated license plate
readers (ALPRs) are high-speed, computer-controlled camera systems that are typically mounted
on street poles, streetlights, highway overpasses, mobile trailers, or attached to police squad cars.
ALPRs automatically capture all license plate numbers that come into view, along with the
location, date, and time. The data, which includes photographs of the vehicle and sometimes its
driver and passengers, is then uploaded to a central server.").
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programs."' The government has monitored electronic communications
and accessed the stored data of individuals, including emails and
computer files-all surreptitiously and without consent. 2 Indeed, the
government has quietly built a series of warehouses of truly immense
proportion in the Utah desert 13 to store the vast amounts of metadata it
114
has compiled on its citizens.
VI. THE COURT'S CALCULUS OF PRIVACY IN A SOCIETY MARKED BY
INCREASING GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

Against a backdrop of stunningly advanced surveillance technology
and the strictures of the United States Constitution, the question of how
individual privacy comports with the need for police investigation is a
complex and impressively difficult one. In the current political landscape,
judicial vigilance becomes increasingly important in protecting the
appropriate dimensions of individual privacy. The grave risks of
governmental abuse may militate in favor of strengthened judicial
oversight in determining the parameters of the state's broad investigative
powers. Strong privacy protections may indeed serve to function as a
111. See, e.g., Nina Gavrilovic, The All-Seeing Eye In The Sky: Drone Surveillance and the
FourthAmendment, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 529, 529-30 (2016); see also Drones/Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles, EFF, https://www.eff.org/pages/dronesunmanned-aerial-vehicles

(last visited

Aug. 31, 2018).

112. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-

callers-without-courts.html; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls,
N.Y. TIES (Dec. 21, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/spying-programsnared-us-calls.html ("A surveillance program approved by President Bush to conduct
eavesdropping without warrants has captured what are purely domestic communications in some
cases, despite a requirement by the White House that one end of the intercepted conversations
take place on foreign soil, officials say." (emphasis added)). See generally NSA Spying: How It
Works, EFF, https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/how-it-works (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) ("In the
weeks after 9/11, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a
range of surveillance activities inside the United States, which had been barred by law and agency
policy for decades.").
113. The government's Stellar Wind Program is located at Camp Williams near Bluffdale,
Utah. It is also known as the Intelligence Community Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative Data Center. See, e.g., Steve Fidel, Utah's $1.5 Billion Cyber-Security Center Under
Way, DESERET NEWS (June 6, 2011, 1:10 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
705363940/Utahs-15-billion-cyber-security-center-under-way.html.
114. Tim Cushing, NSA 's Stellar Wind Program Was Almost Completely Useless, Hidden
from FISA Court by NSA and FBI, TECHDIRT (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:34 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150427/1104243081 1/nsas-stellar-wind-program-wasalmost-completely-useless-hidden-fisa-court-nsa-fbi.shtml ("A huge report (747 pages) on the
NSA's Stellar Wind program has been turned over to Charlie Savage of the New York Times after
a successful FOIA lawsuit. Stellar Wind has its basis in an order issued by George W. Bush shortly
after the 9/11 attacks. Not an executive order, per se, but Bush basically telling the NSA that it
was OK to start collecting email and phone metadata, as well as warrantlessly tap international
calls into and out of the United States.").
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safeguard against the risks of governmental overreach, police
misconduct, and improper warrantless surveillance.
It is possible the increasingly intrusive trend of governmental
investigative activities in the post-9/1 1 period helped shape the Carpenter
ruling and the resulting slight contraction of the third-party doctrine
toward a more appropriate Fourth Amendment equipoise. Although
characterized as a "narrow" ruling by the Carpenter Court, its
significance could likely be far greater than stated at first blushespecially given the sort of advanced surveillance technology that has yet
to come to light. Indeed, the Court may rely on its rationale in the
Carpenter decision in the event of future legal challenges of warrantless
digital searches where the government invokes the third-party doctrine as
justification for those searches. Only time will truly tell. The Court's
decisions in Carpenter, Riley, and Jones, however, could signal the
beginnings of a contraction in the progressively greater investigative
latitude the government has been enjoying in the post-9/11 era.

